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INTRODUCTION

"Clearly, one person's trash is another's treasure."' Although "ediscovery" may be viewed by many as a new, 2 and vexing problem, it
*

The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the authors and not necessarily of
the organizations mentioned.

1.

2.

Maria Perez Crist, Preservingthe Duty to Preserve: The Increasing Vulnerability of
Electronic Information, 58 S.C. L. REv. 7, 9 (2006); accordUnited Med. Supply Co.
v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 257, 258 (2007).
Problems associated with the preservation of electronic materials are not new.
Professor Marcus has noted: "Preservation of discoverable material has always been
a serious concern. Since Rose Mary Woods became famous [in 1973] due to her
reported role in creating an 18 minute gap on a Watergate tape, the risks that
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may also be the forward edge of a digital litigation revolution that
will result in a more efficient process. The Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (Federal Rules or Rules) and common-law principles,
combined with electronic information, present creative litigators with
tools and opportunities to solve litigation problems presented by the
technological revolution, and establish a framework for the just,
speedy, and inexpensive resolution of disputes. 4 Nevertheless,
adapting to change is not problem-free. It requires new approaches to
dynamic issues: "It was neither a comet nor a dramatic climactic
change that killed off the dinosaurs.
They perished because they
5
could not adapt to the digital age.",
The Rules Enabling Act 6 imposes limitations on the scope of the
Federal Rules, creating a gap between the protections the Rules
provide to litigants, and the protections afforded certain litigationrelated actions that often must take place before litigation is
instituted. Because the duty to preserve electronically stored
information (ESI) may arise before a lawsuit is filed, decisions
regarding the scope of that preservation duty may have to be made in
the absence of a clear standard providing practicable guidance
regarding what a court subsequently would require to be preserved,
simply because the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which regulate
the discovery process, are applicable only to pending lawsuits.7
technologically stored information might be lost have been clear." Richard L.
Marcus, E-Discovery & Beyond: Toward Brave New World or 1984?, 25 REv. LITIG.
633 (2006), reprintedin 236 F.R.D. 598, 614 (2006). In fact:
[T]he process of adapting to discovery of electronically stored
information has gone on for a generation. More than thirty-five
years ago, Rule 34 was amended in expectation that discovery of
this material would become important.

3.

More than twenty-five

years ago, major decisions on how to handle discovery of this
material began to occur.
Id. at 618.
Marcus, supra note 2, at 603. Another writer has noted that: "E-discovery presents
marvelous opportunities to minimize the cost and disruption of traditional forms of

4.
5.

discovery."
Steven C. Bennett, Electronic Materials and Other Discovery
Considerations,in INSURANCE COVERAGE 2006: CLAIM TRENDS AND LITIGATION 111,
117-18 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 8412, 2006),
WL 742 PLI/Lit 111.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 1.
Martin A. Redish, Electronic Discovery and the Litigation Matrix, 51 DUKE L.J. 561,

6.
7.

563 (2001) (quoting Jerold S. Solovy & Robert L. Byman, DigitalDiscovery, NAT'L
L.J., Dec. 27, 1999, at A16).
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000).
See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 26(d), (f); see infra Part IV.
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While Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 calls for the interpretation of
the rules of procedure to achieve the just, speedy, and inexpensive
resolution of disputes, 8 the inapplicability of the Rules to pretrial
activity of the party that bears the obligation to preserve suggests that
prudent counsel and cautious litigants may feel compelled to expend
enormous sums to preserve ESI that need not be preserved, will never
be produced in discovery, 9 and that may greatly exceed the economic
value of the claims presented.
This article suggests a mechanism for narrowing the gap between
protections the Federal Rules provide to litigants, and the current
state of uncertainty regarding the scope of the pretrial duty to
preserve ESI that currently plagues potential litigants before litigation
is instituted. 10 It proposes that both procedural and conflict-of-law
issues are best resolved by applying by analogy the protections of
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C) and 37(e) (or
comparable state-law provisions) to guide preservation efforts before
a lawsuit is commenced."
A.

Source of the Duty to Preserve
The duty to preserve relevant information may arise from the
common-law duty to avoid spoliation of discoverable information, or
by statute, regulation, agreement, or court order. 12 In instances that
are not pertinent here, it may also arise from criminal law. 13
8.
9.

"[The Rules] should be construed and administered to secure the just, speedy, and
inexpensive determination of every action and proceeding." FED R. CIv. P. 1.
This article does not address the duty to produce ESI.
[I]t does not follow from a duty to preserve that the preserved
information is automatically subject to production without regard
to issues of burden and relevance. All that preservation does is to
ensure that a judge will be able to make that determination at a
time when it can be put into effect if the justification for
production seems sufficient.
Richard Marcus, Only Yesterday: Reflections on Rulemaking Responses to E-

10.

discovery, 73 FORDHAM L. REv. 1, 14 (2004).
See id. at 17.

11.
12.

See infra Part V.
See infra Part H1.

13.

See, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 215.40 (McKinney 1998). The statute provides:
A person is guilty of tampering with physical evidence when:
1. With intent that it be used or introduced in an official
proceeding or a prospective official proceeding, he (a) knowingly
makes, devises or prepares false physical evidence, or (b)
produces or offers such evidence at such a proceeding knowing it
to be false; or
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B. Scope of the Duty to Preserve
"Perhaps the most vexing issues in electronic discovery, and the
issues that grab the most headlines, are the issue of data preservation
and its flip side, spoliation."' 14 This article suggests that the prelitigation common-law duty to preserve, especially in the context of
ESI, should be guided by the same factors that limit the scope of
discovery and sanctions that may be imposed by the court in
litigation. 5 Specifically, although the duty to preserve often arises
before litigation is commenced, the cost-benefit factors in Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C) do not directly apply before a
complaint is filed.' 6 Because the scope of the duty to preserve is
defined by the scope of discovery, and because the duty to preserve is
neither absolute,' nor intended to cripple organizations, the Rulesbased limitations on the scope of discovery should provide analogous
limits on the scope of the pre-litigation duty to preserve.

2. Believing that certain physical evidence is about to be
produced or used in an official proceeding or a prospective
official proceeding, and intending to prevent such production or
use, he suppresses it by any act of concealment, alteration or
destruction, or by employing force, intimidation or deception
against any person.
Tampering with physical evidence is a class E felony.
14.

Id.
Kenneth J. Withers, Electronically Stored Information: The December 2006
Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,4 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL.
PROP. 171, 188 (2006).

15.
16.

See infra Part V.
See, e.g., Withers, supra note 14, at 177-78; see infra Part IV.

17.

Daniel Renwick Hodgman, Comment, A Port in the Storm?: The Problematicand

Shallow Safe Harborfor Electronic Discovery, 10 Nw. U. L. REV. 259, 268 n.60
(2007); see Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake IV), 220 F.R.D. 212, 217
(S.D.N.Y.

2003);

see also THE SEDONA

CONFERENCE WORKING

ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT RETENTION & PRODUCTION,

THE SEDONA

GROUP ON
CONFERENCE

COMMENTARY ON LEGAL HOLDS: THE TRIGGER AND THE PROCESS 2 n.8 (drft. ed.

2007),
available at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/
Legalholds.pdf [hereinafter LEGAL HOLDS] (stating that "it is 'unreasonable to
expect parties to take every conceivable step to preserve potentially relevant data"'
(quoting THE SEDONA
RECOMMENDATIONS

18.

&

CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA
PRINCIPLES

FOR

PRINCIPLES: BEST PRACTICES,

ADDRESSING

ELECTRONIC

DOCUMENT

PRODUCTION
ii,
princ.
5
(2d
ed.
2007),
available
at
http://www.thesedonaconference.org/content/miscFiles/TSCPRINCP2nd-ed607.
pdf).
See Zubulake IV,220 F.R.D. at 217.
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When Courts Evaluate Pre-LitigationConduct Using Their
InherentPowers, the FederalRules of Civil ProcedureDo Not
Directly Apply to That Conduct

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not directly apply to
actions that occur before a lawsuit is commenced. 19 Nevertheless,
courts are often presented
with sanctions motions based on pre2°
litigation conduct.
Courts may sanction parties for failure to preserve potentially
responsive information even if that failure to preserve pre-dates the
filing of the complaint.1 The court's inherent power is the source of
the power to sanction violations of the pre-litigation duty.22 In short,
if a litigant breaches a common-law preservation duty before a
lawsuit is commenced, and therefore before the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure are applicable, the Federal Rules are not the source
of a trial court's power to punish that litigant for acts that occurred
before the court obtained jurisdiction.
D. PracticalRamifications of the PreservationDilemma
Although at first blush it may seem that this issue is nothing more
than an academic distinction, it has enormous practical significance
for litigants.
For example, assume an organization-whether
governmental or private-recognizes the occurrence of an event that
triggers the substantive duty to preserve ESI, but no lawsuit has been
filed. Assume further that reasonable minds could differ about just
what should be preserved. It may be that there is no known attorney
for a potential plaintiff who could be contacted with an eye toward
reaching an agreement about what should be preserved; or it may be
that an attorney is known, but he or she demands more expansive and
expensive preservation than the organization feels is called for.
Assume further that the cost of "preserving everything," even from
sources that are not readily accessible because of undue burden or
cost, 2 3 greatly exceeds the realistic evaluation of the economic value
of the case. What should the organization do? Must it preserve
everything, regardless of cost or degree of relevancy, or may it make
good-faith decisions regarding what it believes is reasonable under
the circumstances, even if this means that some ESI that may fit

19.
20.
21.
22.

See infra Part IV.
See, e.g., Silvestri v. GMC, 271 F.3d 583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001); Zubulake IV, 220
F.R.D. at 216.
See, e.g., Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 216.
Id.

23.

FED. R. Cv. P. 26.
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within the low threshold of potentially relevant information may be
lost or destroyed? Further, assuming the organization does make a
decision to preserve less than all potentially relevant ESI, because the
cost of preserving all ESI would be unreasonable given the potential
value of the claim that foreseeably could be brought, or because its
relevance is marginal or it is viewed as duplicative, what would be
the consequences to it if litigation is brought, and the court ultimately
determines that the organization failed to preserve unique ESI that
was relevant, indeed essential, to the plaintiffs case? May the
organization be sanctioned for its pre-litigation failure to preserve
and, if so, what sanctions could the court impose?
E. ProposedSolution
In light of the significant sanctions that courts may impose because
of a pre-litigation failure to preserve ESI, 24 the contours of limitations
on the pre-litigation duty to preserve need to be clear and capable of
being articulated by counsel to clients, so that informed judgments
may be made and presented to the reviewing courts with detailed
support and analysis, guided by a body of developing case law.
Furthermore, those limitations should parallel the Federal Rules that
will apply after litigation is commenced.
It is suggested that application by analogy of the protections
afforded in Rules 26(b)(2)(C) and 37(e) is the mechanism to provide
those contours. In the ESI context, the cost-benefit protections of
Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and Rule 37(e)'s "safe harbor" 25 should apply by
analogy to define pre-litigation preservation conduct that is not
directly governed by those Rules. 26 It would, for example, be
anomalous to conclude that a good-faith failure to preserve
information after a lawsuit is commenced should be afforded greater
protection than an identical failure before suit is filed simply because
24.
25.

See infra Part V.
In brief summary, Rule 37(e) provides that a litigant may not be sanctioned under the
Rules when ESI is lost due to the good faith, routine operation of an information
technology system. FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e); see also infra Part IV. An amendment,
effective Dec. 1, 2007, restyled the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and relocated
Rule 37(f) to 37(e), and Rule 37(g) to 37(o. See FED. R. Civ. P. 37 advisory
committee's note to 2007 amendments. Thus, any reference in the main text of this
article to the advisory committee's note to Rule 37(e) refers back the advisory
committee's note to Rule 37(f). See infra notes 37, 51.

26.

See E.E.O.C. v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 995, 997 (M.D. Fla.
1988); see also Thomas Y. Allman, Rule 37() Meets Its Critics: The Justificationfor
a Limited Preservation Safe Harborfor ESI, 5 Nw. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 1

(2006), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/journals/njtip/v5/nl/1/.
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the Rule 37(e) "safe harbor" cannot apply prior to litigation. It would
be equally anomalous to sanction a party because it failed to preserve
information that, under Rule 26(b)(2)(C), is later determined by the
court not to be discoverable.
II. SOURCE OF THE DUTY TO PRESERVE AND ITS CHOICEOF-LAW IMPLICATIONS
Absent some countervailing factor, there is no general duty to
preserve documents, things, or information, whether electronically
stored or otherwise. 27 "The duty to preserve electronic data can arise

27.

Clark v. City of Chi., No. 97 C 4820, 2000 WL 875422, at *12 (N.D. IIt. June 28,
2000); Commercial Bank v. Breedlove (In re Breedlove), No. 04-11096-R, 2007 WL
2034143 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. July 9, 2007) ("Moreover, unless a duty otherwise
exists, a party has no duty to preserve evidence unless and until 'he knows or should
know [that the evidence] is relevant to imminent or ongoing litigation."' (quoting
United States v. Krause (In re Krause), 367 B.R. 740, 764 (Bankr. D. Kan. 2007)
(alteration in original)); Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 270 (Ill.
1995)
("The general rule is that there is no duty to preserve evidence."); see Glotzbach v.
Froman, 854 N.E.2d 337, 340 n.1 (Ind. 2006) (applying Illinois law); PAUL R. RICE,
ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE 52 (ABA 2005) ("In the absence of

pending, or reasonably foreseeable, litigation, a party's good faith discarding of
evidence pursuant to a normal practice is not sanctionable."); MICHAEL C. S. LANGE
& KRISTIN M. NIMSGER, ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE AND DISCOVERY: WHAT EVERY

LAWYER SHOULD KNOW 54 (ABA 2004) (stating that, if there is no statutory or
regulatory duty to maintain information, the retention test is one of
"reasonableness"); Roland C. Goss, Hot Issues in Electronic Discovery: Information
Retention Programs and Preservation,42 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 797, 819
(2007) ("Normally, there is no obligation to preserve documents that are unrelated to
the litigation or the parties involved, and are routinely deleted.").
This is not to say that all documents may be destroyed, even when litigation is not
reasonably anticipated, because not every document management policy is valid.
Arthur Andersen LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696, 704 (2005); Lewy v.
Remington Arms Co., 836 F.2d 1104, 1112 (8th Cir. 1988) (holding that document
retention policy must be reasonable; a gun manufacturer "cannot blindly destroy
documents" and still be protected "by a seemingly innocuous document retention
policy"); Broccoli v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 229 F.R.D. 506, 510 (D. Md. 2005)
(permitting sanctions against corporate defendant whose record destruction policy
was unreasonable). For a description of an improper document destruction scenario,
see In re Napster Inc. Copyright Litig., 462 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1073 (N.D. Cal. 2006)
("Indeed, Hummer's representations regarding its document retention policy are
muddled and inconsistent, and do not suggest an organized effort to maintain
Napster-related communications as required.").
Nevertheless, in one study, the researchers "did not discover a single case where a
court sanctioned a party solely for following its document retention and recycling
policy; there was always another consideration." Shira A. Scheindlin & Kanchana
Wangkeo, Electronic Discovery Sanctions in the Twenty-First Century, 11 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 71, 94 (2004), available at http://www.mttlr.org/
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28
It may arise from statutes, 29
from a wide variety of sources."
regulations, 30 ethical rules, 3 1 court orders, 32 or the common law. 33 A

duty to preserve may also arise through an agreement, a contract, or
another special circumstance.34 State or federal criminal law mays
also define a duty to preserve, within constitutional constraints.
"As noted in the September 2005 Report of the Standing Committee
of the Judicial Conference recommending adoption of the 2006
Amendments, preservation obligations 'arise from independent
sources of law' and are dependent upon 'the substantive law of each

28.

voleleven/scheindlin.pdf; accord Stevenson v. Union Pac. R.R., 354 F.3d 739, 747
(8th Cir. 2004).
Dale M. Cendali et al., PotentialEthical Pitfalls in Electronic Discovery, in ETHICS
IN CONTEXT 2007: ETHICS AND ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY 111, 113 (PLI N.Y. Practice

29.

30.

31.

32.
33.

34.

35.

Skills, Course Handbook No. 10960, 2007), WL 171 PLUNY 105.
Id. (citing 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(3)(C)(i) (2006)). Sarbanes-Oxley is another
important statutory source of a duty to preserve. Id. at 113. No effort is made in this
article to exhaustively list statutory or regulatory sources of a duty to preserve
information.
"[T]he rules of both the National Association of Securities Dealers and the Securities
and Exchange Commission require the preservation for three years of instant
messages involving securities trading activities." Goss, supra note 27, at 821.
Cendali et al., supra note 28, at 113 ("According to ABA Model Rule of Professional
Conduct 3.4, which governs fairness to the opposing party and counsel, 'a lawyer
shall not unlawfully obstruct another party's access to evidence or unlawfully alter,
destroy or conceal a document or other material having potential evidentiary
value."').
Id.at 114 (citing Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645, 651-52
(D. Minn. 2002) (issuing a preservation order to guard against the loss of data)).
Id.(citing Zubulake IV,220 F.R.D. 212, 218 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)); LEGAL HOLDS, supra
note 17, at 1 ("The duty to preserve typically arises from the common law duty to
avoid spoliation of relevant evidence for use at trial; the inherent power of the courts;
and court rules governing the imposition of sanctions.").
Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 271 (111.
1995) ("[A] duty to preserve
evidence may arise through an agreement, a contract, a statute or another special
circumstance. Moreover, a defendant may voluntarily assume a duty by affirmative
conduct." (citations omitted)). A preservation letter is not a necessary predicate to
triggering the duty. Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93,
100 (D. Md. 2003). Further, a preservation letter that is watered down as a
settlement proposal may not trigger the duty. Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC v. Land
O'Lakes, Inc., 244 F.R.D. 614, 623 (D. Colo. 2007).
This article is limited to the duty to preserve in connection with civil claims and
actions. The prosecution's duty to preserve evidence in criminal cases involves
different principles. See, e.g., California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 488-89 (1984).
Similarly, a target's duty may involve different principles. E.g., Arthur Andersen
LLP v. United States, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
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jurisdiction.' 36 The duty was not created by the
37 Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure or the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Regardless of its source, the existence of the duty is wellestablished.38 In some instances, the duty to preserve is governed by
state law; in others, by federal law.

36.

37.
38.

Thomas Y. Allman, Managing Preservation ObligationsAfter the 2006 Federal EDiscovery Amendments,
13
RICH. J.L.
& TECH.
9,
1 (2007),
http://Iaw.richmond.edu/jolt/vl3i3/article9.pdf (quoting REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL
CONFERENCE COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE Rules-Pages 32, 34
(2005),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf
[hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE]).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) and accompanying advisory committee's note to the 2006
amendments. See supra note 25.
See, e.g., Crist, supra note 1, at 13 n.24. Professor Crist noted that:
All circuits recognize the duty to preserve information relevant
to anticipated or existing litigation. See Vazquez-Corales v. SeaLand Serv., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 10, 11 (D.P.R. 1997) (citing Baliotis
v. McNeil, 870 F. Supp. 1285, 1290 (M.D. Pa. 1994); Allstate Ins.
Co. v. Creative Env't Corp., 28 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1352,
1358 (D.R.1 1994)); Fujitsu Ltd. v. Fed. Express Corp., 247 F.3d
423, 436 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Kronisch v. United States, 150
F.3d 112, 126 (2d Cir. 1998)); In re Wechsler, 121 F. Supp. 2d
404, 415 (D. Del. 2000); Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp., 271 F.3d
583, 591 (4th Cir. 2001) (citing Kronisch, 150 F.3d at 126);
Williams v. Briggs Co., 62 F.3d 703, 708 (5th Cir. 1995); Beil v.
Lakewood Eng'g & Mfg. Co., 15 F.3d 546, 552 (6th Cir. 1994)
(citing Taylor v. Medtronics, Inc., 861 F.2d 980, 985 (6th Cir.
1988)); Cooper v. United Vaccines, Inc., 117 F. Supp. 2d 864,
874 (E.D. Wis. 2000) (citing Sentry Ins. v. Royal Ins. Co. of Am.,
539 N.W.2d 911, 916 (Wis. Ct. App. 1995)); Concord Boat Corp.
v. Brunswick Corp., No LR-C-95-781, 1997 WL 33352759, at *4
(E.D. Ark. Aug. 29, 1997) (citing Turner v. Hudson Transit Lines,
Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)); Nat'l Ass'n of
Radiation Survivors v. Turnage, 115 F.R.D. 543, 556-57 (N.D.
Cal. 1987) (quoting Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. Gen. Nutrition
Corp., 593 F. Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1984)); Procter &
Gamble Co. v. Haugen, 179 F.R.D. 622, 631 (D. Utah 1998),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Proctor & Gamble Co. v.
Haugen, 222 F.3d 1262 (10th Cir. 2000) (citing Gen. Nutrition,
593 F. Supp. at 1455); Fla. Evergreen Foliage v. E.I. DuPont De
Nemours & Co., 336 F. Supp. 2d 1239, 1272 (S.D. Fla. 2004)
(citing Green Leaf Nursery v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.,
341 F.3d 1292, 1308-09 (11th Cir. 2003)); Holmes v. Amerex
Rent-A-Car, 180 F.3d 294, 296 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
Id.
Several Maryland sanction decisions implicate that duty. See, e.g., Weaver v.
ZeniMax Media, Inc., 174 Md. App. 16, 43, 923 A.2d 1032, 1048 (2007) (noting that
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In Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake 1), for example, the
plaintiff asserted federal and state claims; 39 however, the court had no
40
need to specify the fundamental source of the duty to preserve ESI.
In state courts, and in federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction,
the rule appears to be that state law governs the pre-litigation duty to
preserve, I while federal rules govern the procedure of a case after it
is commenced in federal court. 42 Where a federal court exercises
federal subject-matter jurisdiction, however, the duty to preserve
appears to be governed entirely by federal law.43 For example, where
federal regulations apply, they may define the duty."
The impact of the conflict-of-laws issue on a pre-litigation
assessment of both the source and scope of the duty to preserve
illustrates the need for clear guidance to litigants attempting to

39.
40.
41.

42.
43.

44.

spoliation occurs when the filing of a suit is fairly imminent and evidence is
intentionally destroyed).
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake 1), 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Id. at 316-17.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Broan Mfg. Co., No. CV-06-889-PHX-SMM, 2007
WL 3390882, at *1 (D. Ariz. Nov. 13, 2007); Lawrence v. Harley-Davidson Motor
Co., No. 99 C 2609, 1999 WL 637172, at *2 (N.D. Il1. Aug. 12, 1999); Thomas v.
Bombadier-Rotax Motorenfabrik, GmbH, 869 F. Supp. 551, 553-54 (N.D. 111.1994);
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Frigidaire, 146 F.R.D. 160, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1992)
(applying Erie doctrine); see Allstate Ins. Co. v. Sunbeam Corp., 53 F.3d 804, 806
(7th Cir. 1995) (recognizing a state duty of preservation by agreement of parties);
Ward v. Tex. Steak Ltd., No. Civ.7:03 CV 00596, 2004 WL 1280776, at *2 (W.D.
Va. May 27, 2004); JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE supra note 36, at Rules-Page
34 (recommending adoption of the 2006 amendments and stating that preservation
obligations are dependent upon "the substantive law of each jurisdiction" (emphasis
added)); contra St. Cyr v. Flying J, Inc., No. 3:06-cv-13-33TEM, 2007 WL
1716365, at *3 (M.D. Fla. June 12, 2007).
See, e.g., Thomas, 669 F. Supp. at 553 (citing Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465
(1965)).
Doctor John's, Inc. v. City of Sioux City, 486 F. Supp. 2d 953, 954 (N.D. Iowa 2007)
("Indeed, both state and federal law require just the opposite, retention of evidence
potentially relevant to pending or reasonably anticipated litigation."); Floeter v. City
of Orlando, No. 6:05-cv-400-Orl-22KRS, 2007 WL 486633 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 9, 2007)
(applying federal law in lawsuit asserting Title VII and state claims, but using Florida
law for guidance); see also Qualcomm Inc. v. Broadcom Corp., No. 05cv1958-B
(BLM), 2007 WL 2900537, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept. 28, 2007) ("Initially, the Court
finds that federal common law governs the privilege issues in the instant dispute
because the underlying case involves federal questions of law, specifically patent
law."), enforced, 2008 WL 66932 (S.D. Cal. Jan. 7, 2008), vacated and remanded in
part, No. 05CV1958-RMB (BLM), 2008 WL 638108 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 5, 2008);
LEGAL HOLDS, supra note 17, at 1 (referring to a "federal common law of
spoliation").
Estate of LeMay v. Eli Lily & Co., 960 F. Supp. 183, 186 (E.D. Wis. 1997).
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preserve ESI prior to litigation. Consider a hypothetical Maryland
corporation with ESI physically located on servers and workstations
in Maryland and Delaware. Assume that the corporation receives a
notice of a lawsuit presenting state and federal claims from a Virginia
plaintiff45 regarding a series of events, meetings, or transactions that
occurred in the District of Columbia, Virginia, and Maryland, and via
email to locations in Colorado and Georgia, with a possible filing in
federal or state court in any of three fora. The corporation's duty to
preserve may arise under the laws of the various states, under federal
law, or both. Unless there are clear and universal proportionality
guidelines applicable to the pre-litigation duty to preserve, the
potential defendant must be prepared to comply with the duty to
preserve as it may be defined in at least three federal circuits, four
federal districts, and four state courts. If a federal forum is selected,
absent uniformity, a federal court hearing federal and supplemental
state claims could reach differing results regarding a breach of the
pre-litigation duty to preserve. 46 In short, because the pre-litigation
duty to preserve does not spring from the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure or the Federal Rules of Evidence, it cannot be directly
limited by those rules. Absent a meaningful and uniform ability to
predict the scope of the duty to preserve based on the kind of costbenefit analysis articulated in the Federal Rules, a preserving litigant
may be unfairly exposed to excessive costs or, alternatively, a motion
for the imposition of sanctions, even if the entity acted in good faith.
47
III. SCOPE OF THE DUTY TO PRESERVE

In Zubulake v. UBS WarburgLLC (Zubulake I),48 the court noted:
'49
"The broad contours of the duty to preserve are relatively clear.
On a more detailed level, however, Judge Scheindlin, the author of
45.
46.

47.

48.
49.

In Zubulake I,for example, Ms. Zubulake asserted both federal and state claims
against UBS Warburg LLC. 217 F.R.D. 309, 311 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Spoliation, as opposed to breach of the duty to preserve, has been held to be a matter
of the substantive federal law of evidence. See, e.g., State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
Broan Mfg. Co., 2007 WL 3390882, at * 1 (finding that state law governed the duty to
preserve; however, federal law governed sanctions for the breach); St. Cyr, 2007 WL
1716365, at *3; Nichols v. Steelcase, Inc., No. Civ.A. 2:04-0434, 2005 WL 1862422,
at *8 (D. W.Va. Aug. 4, 2005).
This article does not specifically address the scope of the duty to preserve
communications with experts who will be called to testify as witnesses at trial. See,
e.g., Univ. of Pittsburgh v. Townsend, Nov. 3:04-cv-291, 2007 WL 1002317, at *4
(E.D. Tenn. Mar. 30, 2007) (finding that e-mails between counsel and expert were
discoverable).
220 F.R.D. 212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
Id.at 217.
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the Zubulake opinions, has noted: "The obligation to preserve
relevant evidence cannot be defined with precision."50 Just as they
did not create the duty to preserve, the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure do not define the scope of the pre-litigation duty to
preserve.51 The preservation of ESI presents special concerns,
50.

SHIRA A. SCHEFNDLIN, MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE E-DISCOVERY: THE NEWLY

AMENDED FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 7 n.28 (2006); accord GEORGE L.
PAUL

51.

&

BRUCE

A.

NEARON,

THE

DISCOVERY

REVOLUTION:

F-DISCOVERY

AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 35 (ABA 2006) ("While
it is fairly simple to articulate a party's duty to preserve electronic evidence
generally, it is substantially more complicated to outline the scope of that duty.");
LEGAL HOLDS, supra note 17, at 2 ("The basic principle that an organization has a
duty to preserve relevant information in anticipation of litigation is easy to articulate.
However, the precise application of that duty can be elusive.").
While there is general agreement that the duty to preserve is only a "reasonable"
duty, see discussion infra Part III, there is not unanimity in describing what the
reasonable limits to the scope of the duty to preserve are. For example, in 2001, one
commentator noted:
Simply turning on a personal computer might destroy some such
data, so one could insist that once litigation commences, or when
the prospect appears on the horizon, no personal computer of a
party or potential party should be turned on. That sort of
overbroad preservation idea suggests the magnitude of the new
spoliation concern.
Richard L. Marcus, Confronting the Future: Coping with Discovery of Electronic
Material, 64 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 253, 268 (2001) (footnote omitted). One year
later, a federal district court noted its concern that routine use of a personal computer
might result in the loss of relevant information and ordered preservation of the
computer. Antioch Co. v. Scrapbook Borders, Inc., 210 F.R.D. 645 (2002). The
court wrote:
Accordingly, we conclude that the Defendants may have relevant
information, on their computer equipment, which is being lost
through normal use of the computer, and which might be relevant
to the Plaintiffs claims, or the Defendants' defenses. This
information may be in the form of stored or deleted computer
files, programs, or e-mails, on the Defendants' computer
equipment.
Id.at 651-52. The court then ordered that the computer be imaged. Id.at 653. In
short, what initially appeared to be an overbroad preservation obligation was required
in an actual case shortly thereafter. While the court's holding and the commentator's
conclusions are not necessarily inconsistent, they illustrate the difficulty that
preserving litigants and counsel face in predicting the scope of the duty to preserve
information.
Hodgman, supra note 17, at 281. It has recently been noted that: "Given the
inconsistent case law and local rules, companies must approach the issue of
preserving electronic data on a case-by-case basis." Jeffrey S. Follett, Hold
Everything? Litigation Response in the Electronic Age, in ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY
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including the dynamic, often ephemeral nature of some ESI. 52 For
example, Sedona Guideline No. 7 provides: "In determining the
scope of information that should be preserved, the nature of the issues
raised in the matter, experience in similar circumstances53 and the
amount in controversy are factors that may be considered.,
The scope of the duty to preserve information was described in
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg LLC (Zubulake V),54 where the court

noted: "[A] party and her counsel must make certain that all sources
of potentially relevant information[ 55] are identified and placed 'on
hold,' to the extent required in Zubulake IV."' 56 In Zubulake IV, the
court held:
At the same time, anyone who anticipates being a party or
is a party to a lawsuit must not destroy unique, relevant
evidence that might be useful to an adversary. "While a
litigant is under no duty to keep or retain every document in
its possession ... it is under a duty to preserve what it
knows, or reasonably should know, is relevant in the action,
is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery57 of
AND RETENTION GUIDANCE FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL 2006 237, 249 (PLI Litig. &

52.

53.

54.
55.

56.
57.

Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 9006, 2006), WL 747 PLI/Lit 237.
The Advisory Committee Notes to Rule 37(1) state that the duty to preserve "depends
on the circumstances of each case." FED. R. Civ. P. 37(e) and accompanying
advisory committee's note to the 2006 amendments. See supra note 25.
See Conor R. Crowley, A Shifting View of Preservation: How Ephemeral Are
Current Views on Shifting the Costs of Preservation,Digital Discovery & E-Evidence
Rep. (BNA) 1, 2-4 (Jan. 1, 2008)..
LEGAL HOLDS, supra note 17, at 3. The duty to preserve extends only to "unique"
information. Id. at 12. It is, however, difficult to determine what information is
"unique" prior to preserving it for examination.
229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
On occasion, the duty is described as a duty to preserve relevant "evidence." China
Ocean Shipping Group v. Simone Metals Inc., No. 97 C 2694, 1999 WL 966443, at
*3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1999). The Zubulake IV court, however, described the duty in
terms of "relevant information," 220 F.R.D. at 218, and the Sedona Conference
stated: "[l]t is important to recognize that the duty to preserve extends only to
relevant information." LEGAL HOLDS, supra note 17, at 11. The word "information"
may lead to different conclusions than the word "evidence," and the former is likely
the more accurate term. See FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1) ("Relevant information need not
be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the
discovery of admissible evidence."). Thus, the Sedona Conference stated, "[T]he
[preserving] organization should identify what information should be preserved."
LEGAL HOLDS, supra note 17, at 12 (emphasis added).
Id. at 432.
The scope of discovery is set forth in FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) ("Parties may obtain
discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party's claim or
defense-including the existence, description, nature, custody, condition, and
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395

admissible evidence, is reasonably likely to be requested
during discovery 58and/or is the subject of a pending
discovery request."
Similarly, in In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litigation,59 the district
court ruled that the duty encompassed all material that the party
'6
"knows or reasonably should know is relevant to the action. 5 0
Descriptions of the scope of the common-law duty to preserve are
virtually coextensive with the scope of discovery. For example, one

58.
59.

60.
61.

location of any documents or other tangible things and the identity and location of
persons who know of any discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order
discovery of any matter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action.
Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if the discovery appears
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery
is subject to the limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(C).") Rule 26(b)(1) sets a
minimal threshold for discovery. Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.,
219 F.R.D. 93, 97 (D. Md. 2003).
Special circumstances may provide justification for narrowing the amount of
discovery. See Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966-67 (2007)
(considering cost of discovery in antitrust action); Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court for
D.C., 542 U.S. 385, 388 (2004) (holding that respect for the Executive Office
informs the "entire proceeding"); Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 707 (1997); Hoffman
LaRoche, Inc. v. Sperling, 493 U.S. 165, 179 (1989) (citing FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b));
Oppenheimer Fund Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351-52 (1978).
Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 217 (emphasis added) (citing Turner v. Hudson Trans.
Lines, Inc., 142 F.R.D. 68, 72 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)).
462 F. Supp. 2d 1060, 1067 (N.D. Cal. 2006), rev'd, 479 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2007),
vacated, Nos. C-MDL-00-1369(MHP), C-04-1166 (MHP), 2007 WL 844551 (N.D.
Cal. Mar. 20, 2007).
Id.; accord Thompson, 219 F.R.D. at 100 (quoting Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 216
(noting that a litigation hold applies to "relevant" documents)).
Hynix Semiconductor, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., No. C-00-20905 RMW, 2006 WL
565893, at *27 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 5, 2006) (finding that duty does not extend beyond
what is relevant and material); Broccoli v. Echostar Commc'ns Corp., 229 F.R.D.
506, 510 (D. Md. 2005) ("The duty to preserve encompasses any documents or
tangible items authored or made by individuals likely to have discoverable
information that the disclosing party may use to support its claims or defenses."
(citing Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 217-18)); China Ocean Shipping Group v. Simone
Metals Inc., No. 97 C 2694, 1999 WL 966443, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 30, 1999)
(holding there is a duty to preserve relevant evidence); Goss, supra note 27, at 818
("Generally, a party is bound to preserve all information that one might reasonably
anticipate to be discoverable in an action."); Hodgman, supra note 1717, at 268
(noting that if a party had notice of relevance of information, it had a duty to preserve
it). See Larson v. Bank One Corp., No. 00 C 2100, 2005 WL 4652509, at *10 (N.D.
Ill. Aug. 18, 2005) ("Under the Federal Rules, parties to any litigation have the duty
to preserve documents commensurate with the scope of discovery allowed under
Fed.R.Civ.P. 26." (footnote omitted)); Danis v. USN Commc'ns, Inc., No. 98 C
7482, 2000 WL 1694325, at *32 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2000) ("The scope of the duty to
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commentator asked: "What [m]ust [b]e [r]etained and [p]reserved?
The simple answer is potentially relevant evidence. This includes
any evidence that could be helpful in proving or disproving a claim or
defense. ' 62 In short, the link between the scope of the duty to
preserve and the scope of discovery is clear: "Preservation duties do
not exist in the abstract, but to serve a purpose: that is to ensure that
discoverable documents are available to be produced." 4
Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, however, the scope of
discovery cannot be definitively ascertained before suit is
commenced. For example, although the December 2007 amendments
limit discovery to matters related to the parties' "claims or defenses,"
the court has discretion to expand discovery to all facts related to the
"subject matter involved in the action." 64 Counsel faced with
determining the scope of the pre-litigation duty to preserve cannot
know which discovery standard will subsequently apply. While
prudence may suggest application of the broader standard, doing so
may unnecessarily increase the cost of preservation of ESI.
Even if the governing standard was fixed, the volume and
65
complexity of discovery disputes presented to courts for resolution
preserve is a broad one, commensurate with the breadth of discovery permissible
under Fed.R.Civ.P. 26."); Wm. T. Thompson Co. v. General Nutrition Corp., 593 F.
Supp. 1443, 1455 (C.D. Cal. 1984) (stating that a duty includes what "is reasonably
likely to be requested during discovery .... ); Cendali et al., supra note 28, at 115;
Crist, supra note 1, at 19 ("The scope of the duty to preserve within the context of
civil litigation is framed by the relevance provisions within the Federal Rules of
Evidence and the discovery provisions within the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure."); Alan M. Anderson, Issuing and Managing Litigation Hold-Notices, 64
BENCH

62.
63.
64.
65.

&

BAR

OF

MINN.

20,

20

(2007),

available

at

http://www2.mnbar.org/benchandbar/2007/aug07/litigation held.htm (stating that an
entity "is under a duty to preserve what it knows, or reasonably should know, is
relevant in the action, is reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence, is reasonably likely to be requested during discovery and/or is the subject
of a pending discovery request").
RICE, supra note 27, at 66.
Danis, 2000 WL 1694325, at *33.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
In one study analyzing the discovery process, forty percent of attorneys surveyed
"reported unnecessary discovery expenses due to discovery problems." Thomas E.
Willging et al., An Empirical Study of Discovery and Disclosure Practice Under the
1993 FederalRule Amendments, 39 B.C. L. REv. 525, 532 (1998). The complexity is
demonstrated by Smith v. Cafg Asia, 246 F.R.D. 19 (D.D.C. 2007), where the court
was faced with a motion to compel production of images stored on a cell phone. The
court noted: "As such, the question of discoverability is inseparable from
admissibility, and a determination is necessary of whether, under Federal Rules of
Evidence 403 and 412(b)(2), the probative value of the images substantially
outweighs their prejudice." Id. at 20. Because the duty to preserve is coextensive
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demonstrates that its application to specific factual situations remains
open to debate. In order to comply with the pre-litigation duty to
preserve, a litigant must predict what will be discoverable before
receiving a lawsuit or discovery request.
IV. THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE DO NOT
APPLY BEFORE AN ACTION IS COMMENCED BY THE
FILING OF A COMPLAINT; HOWEVER, THE DUTY TO
PRESERVE MAY ARISE BEFORE A COMPLAINT IS FILED
The duty to preserve may arise long before litigation commences,
and continues throughout the course of litigation. If the duty is
breached after the commencement of a lawsuit, that breach, and any
applicable sanction, will be governed by the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 66 A more difficult issue arises when the duty to preserve
is violated6 7 before a lawsuit is commenced by the filing of a
complaint.

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 1 provides: "These rules govern
the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil
nature whether cognizable as cases at law or in equity or in admiralty,
with the exceptions stated in Rule 8 1.'68 It is immediately apparent
that the Rules apply 69"in" the courts, not to matters that predate
initiation of litigation.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure are promulgated under the
Rules Enabling Act.70 That statute provides that: "The Supreme
Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and
procedure and rules of evidence for cases in the United States district
courts (including proceedings before magistrate judges thereof) and
courts of appeals." 71 It states that the rules may not abridge, enlarge,
or modify any substantive right.72 Again, the statute provides that

66.
67.
68.
69.

70.
71.
72.

with discoverability, this decision illustrates the difficulty in determining what needs
to be preserved.
See, e.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 3, 37(e).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 3 (stating that an action is commenced by the filing of a
complaint).
FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
See generally 4 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE
AND PROCEDURE § 1012 (2002) ("[T]he language of Rule 1 limits the applicability of
the federal rules to the United States district courts ....
"); PAUL W. GRIMM &
MICHAEL BERMAN, MARYLAND'S DISCOVERY PROTOCOL 4 (LexisNexis 2007).
28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000).
Id. § 2072(a).
Id. § 2072(b). In the September 2005 Report of the Standing Committee of the

Judicial Conference recommending adoption of the 2006 amendments, the drafters
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Rules may be prescribed "for cases in" court, and not prior to the
commencement of cases.73 A lawsuit or action is commenced when a
complaint is filed.74
It is well-accepted that the Federal Rules do not directly govern
pre-litigation conduct. For example, in connection with the sanctions
rule: "Rule 37 does not, by its terms, address sanctions for
destruction of evidence prior to the initiation of a lawsuit or
discovery requests." 75 This limitation was likely a jurisdictional
constraint imposed on the drafters: "The Advisory Committee on
Civil Rules debated whether it could specify preservation obligations
in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure but ultimately decided it
could not do So. ' ' 7 6 In fact, "[a] major criticism of Rule 37(f) [now,
Rule 37(e)] is that it addresses only sanctions under the federal rules,
77
which generally do not apply prior to commencement of litigation.,
A similar conclusion should be reached in connection with Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C). The entire structure of that Rule
is directed toward events occurring during litigation. For example,
the title of Rule 26 is "General Provisions Governing Discovery;
Duty of Disclosure." 78 Rule 26(b) is captioned "Discovery Scope
and Limits." 79 Also, Rule 26(b)(2)(C) addresses the "frequency or
extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules. 80 The term
"discovery" refers to a process that begins, at the earliest, with the

73.
74.
75.

76.
77.

78.
79.
80.

wrote that preservation obligations are dependent upon the "substantive law of each
jurisdiction." See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE COMMITTEE, supra note 36, at Rule-Page 34
(emphasis added). Courts sitting in diversity have held that the duty to preserve is
"substantive," not "procedural." See, e.g., Thomas v. Bombardier-Rotax, 869 F.
Supp. 551, 553 (N.D. Ill. 1994); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Frigidaire, 146 F.R.D.
160, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1992). If the duty to preserve is substantive, the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure may not abridge, enlarge, or modify it. See § 2072(b).
§ 2072(a).
FED. R. Cv. P. 3.
Capellupo v. FMC Corp., 126 F.R.D. 545, 550-51 (D. Minn. 1989) (citing EEOC v.
Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 995, 997-98 (M.D. Fla. 1988) (emphasis
omitted)); ABC Home Health Servs., Inc. v. Int'l Bus. Machs., 158 F.R.D. 180, 182
(S.D. Ga. 1994) ("Rule 37 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure authorizes a court
to impose sanctions for discovery abuses. In this case, Rule 37 does not directly
apply because the alleged destruction of documents took place before the action was
filed and before discovery began." (citation omitted) (emphasis omitted)); see
Hodgman, supra note 17, at 261.
LEGAL HOLDS, supra note 17, at 5 n. 13.
Allman, supranote 26, at 43. It should be noted that criticism cannot be directed at
the drafters of the Rule, because the drafters were limited by the Rules Enabling Act.
Id. 45.
FED. R. Civ. P. 26.
Id.
Id.
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filing of a complaint. 8 1 By its express82 terms, Rule 26(b)(2)(C)
applies only after a lawsuit is commenced.
The duty to preserve may, and often does, arise before
commencement of a case, because litigation is often "reasonably
anticipated" before it occurs. 83 In that event, neither the cost-benefit
protections of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) nor the "safe harbor" of Rule 37(e)
directly apply to the person or entity that is attempting to comply
with its preservation obligation, even though that obligation may be
defined by the scope of discovery that will apply the moment after
litigation is commenced, and even though those Rules will apply after
litigation is commenced in federal courts.
The pre-litigation implications are clear. A person or entity faced
with a duty to preserve prior to litigation must preserve potentially
relevant information. If ESI is destroyed by the routine, good-faith
operation of a computer system prior to litigation, the preserving
party cannot ascertain whether or not it is protected from sanctions.
V. COURTS MAY EVALUATE PRESERVATION ACTIONS
OCCURRING BEFORE LITIGATION IS COMMENCED BY
USING THEIR INHERENT POWERS, NOT THE FEDERAL
RULES, AND, IN SO DOING, THEY SHOULD RECOGNIZE
LIMITATIONS ON THE SCOPE OF THE DUTY TO
PRESERVE BY ANALOGY TO FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 26(b)(2)(C) AND 37(e)
A.

When Courts Evaluate Pre-LitigationPreservationDecisions,

They Do So Under Their InherentPower
If Rule 26(b)(2)(C)'s cost-benefit protections and Rule 37(e)'s
"safe harbor" are to be applied to pre-litigation events, it is necessary
to examine the source of a federal court's power to exercise
jurisdiction over events that occurred before the action was filed.
The Supreme Court has recognized that courts have inherent power to
reach some pre-litigation activity. 84 That power, although broad, is
not unlimited.85
81.

82.

83.
84.

See B & C Tire Co. v. IRS, 376 F. Supp. 708, 712, 714 (N.D. Ala. 1978) (stating
general rule; yet, noting exception for discovery to perpetuate evidence); In re Royal
Bank of Can., 33 F.R.D. 296, 299, 302 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C) (listing aspects of the discovery process and/or
discovery request that the court shall consider in relation to the facts of a particular
case to determine whether to limit the scope of discovery).
LEGAL HOLDS, supra note 17, at 5.
E.g., Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 764-67, (1980); Link v. Wabash
R.R Co., 370 U.S. 626, 631-32 (1962); Gumbel v. Pitkin, 124 U.S. 131, 146-47
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These principles are applicable to the sanctions rule. In the general
Rule 37 context, courts have squarely held that, although the Rule
does not directly apply to pre-litigation conduct, it may be applied by
analogy. For example, it has recently been noted that:
Several courts have held that Rule 37 sanctions are
available even where evidence is destroyed before the
issuance of a discovery request, with a few going so far as to
apply the rule to conduct that occurred before the lawsuit
was filed, provided the party was on notice of a claim. But,
the majority view-and the one most easily reconciled with
the terms of the rule-is that Rule 37 is narrower in scope
and does not apply before the discovery regime is
triggered.86
Capellupo v. FMC Corp.87 is representative of the majority view.
Rule 37, Fed.R.Civ.P., is applicable to the "normal"
disputes, delays, or difficulties occurring in civil litigation.
Its sanctions are appropriate in instances of a litigant's
failure to make or cooperate in discovery. Rule 37 enables a
court to punish the litigant who has not responded
adequately to discovery requests of an opposing party or to
orders of the court compelling discovery. Rule 37 does not,

85.

86.
87.

(1888); Allman, supra note 26, at 44 ("Courts often cite their inherent powers to
sanction when it is unclear that rule-based sanction authority exists.").
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43-46 (1991) ("It has long been understood
that '[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our Courts of justice from
the nature of their institution,' powers 'which cannot be dispensed with in a Court,
because they are necessary to the exercise of all others.' These powers are 'governed
not by rule or statute but by the control necessarily vested in courts to manage their
own affairs so as to achieve the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.' . . .
Because of their very potency, inherent powers must be exercised with rcstraint and
discretion. A primary aspect of that discretion is the ability to fashion an appropriate
sanction for conduct which abuses the judicial process. . . . [T]he inherent power
extends to a full range of litigation abuses. At the very least, the inherent power must
continue to exist to fill in the interstices."
(citations omitted)); cf. Societe
Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers, 357
U.S. 197, 207 (1958) (noting that Rule 37 is the sole source of sanctions in discovery
disputes).
United Med. Supply Co. v. United States, 77 Fed. Cl. 257, 268 (2007) (footnote
omitted).
126 F.R.D. 545 (D. Minn. 1989).
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by its terms, address sanctions for destruction of evidence
88
prior to the initiation of a lawsuit or discovery requests.
Courts like Capellupo have, however,89 looked to Rule 37 to guide
their exercise of their inherent powers.
Thus, even though Rule 37 is not directly applicable to prelitigation conduct, when sanctions are imposed, Rule 37 may guide
the court's discretion:
Prior to the selection of sanction, if any, the Court notes
the source of its authority. Defendant challenges the Court's
power to impose sanctions pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37.
EEOC agrees that Rule 37 does not directly apply, but
insists that the rule is a guide for the exercise of the Court's
inherent authority to deal with discovery abuses. The Court
agrees with EEOC's analysis. Conduct of the kind which
ordinarily would be sanctionable under Rule 37, but falls
outside the express terms of the rule, can be sanctioned by
proper exercise of this Court's inherent powers. Although
Rule 37 does not apply by its terms, the Court looks to that
rule as a guide to determine the proper level of response to
defendant's offense. This reliance on the principles of Rule
37 is particularly appropriate in the light of the conduct at
issue. Defendant destroyed records for which it was on
notice that it had a legal duty to preserve, and that duty is
imposed, in part, to ensure that those records are available
for litigation of a discrimination charge. Rule 37 deals with
similar conduct when the legal duty to preserve evidence is
imposed in the course of a lawsuit. The present case
logically extends Rule 37 principles to the situation in which
the legal duty to preserve evidence arises by force of
administrative regulation prior to the commencement of a
lawsuit. Two of the policies underlying Rule 37-the
elimination of profit from failure to comply with the legal
duty to preserve evidence and the general deterrent effect
that sanctions for an offense will have on the instant case
and on other litigation-particularly justify the Court's
88.
89.

Id. at 551 n.14 (citing EEOC v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 690 F. Supp. 995, 99798 (M.D. Fla. 1988)).
See State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Frigidaire, 146 F.R.D. 160, 163 (N.D. Ill. 1997);
Hodgman, supra note 17, at 266; cf Weaver v. ZeniMax Media, Inc., 175 Md. App.
16, 28-31, 923 A.2d 1032, 1039-41, 1047 (2007) (prior to litigation, employee
improperly obtained email from employer; trial court "has inherent authority to
sanction conduct that occurred prior to the commencement of the litigation" (citing
Klupt v. Krongard, 126 Md. App. 179, 728 A.2d 727 (1999))).
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decision to extend Rule 37 principles to the present case.
Encouraging compliance with the administratively imposed
duty to preserve evidence in pending discrimination
complaints shares these common goals with Rule 37 and
therefore the Court should exercise its inherent powers to
reach the case in which evidence is destroyed prior to trial in
violation of 29 C.F.R. § 1602.14.90
In short, courts have used their inherent powers to reach prelitigation conduct and have informed their use of those powers by
looking to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for guidance. There
is no reason why courts could not do the same with the cost-benefit
provisions of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and the "safe harbor" of Rule 37(e).
B.

Courts Should Use Analogous Provisionsof the FederalRules of
Civil Procedureto Guide the Exercise of Their Inherent Powers
to Evaluate Pre-LitigationPreservationDecisions

At present, there is no assurance 91 that the pre-litigation commonlaw preservation standard is the same as the parallel discovery
standard containing the added cost-benefit protections of Rule
26(b)(2)(C) and the "safe harbor" of Rule 37(e). If the common-law
preservation standard were to differ from the litigation standard of
Rule 37(e), anomalous results might occur. The absence of clear
proportionality guidelines may permit coercive demands92 and
settlements. This risk applies to both plaintiffs and defendants.
90.

91.

92.

Jacksonville Shipyards, 690 F. Supp. at 997-98 (citations omitted). In short, the
result should be identical regardless of whether conduct occurred before or during
litigation. See Danis v. USN Commc'ns, Inc., No. 98 C 7482, 2000 WL 1694325, at
*30 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 23, 2000) ("Whether proceeding under Rule 37 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure or under a court's inherent powers, the 'analysis is
essentially the same."' (quoting Cobell v. Babbit, 37 F. Supp. 2d 6, 18 (D.D.C.
1999)) (citing Gates Rubber Co. v. Bando Chem. Indus., Ltd., 167 F.R.D. 90, 107 (D.
Colo. 1996))); accord Larson v. Bank One Corp., No. 00 C 2100, 2005 WL 4652509,
at *8 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 18, 2005) ("[U]nder either Rule 37 or under the Court's inherent
authority, the analysis for imposing sanctions is essentially the same.").
As recently as the fall of 2006, a leading commentator noted only that it was
"unlikely" that courts would "invoke their inherent power in order to reach a
different result on the same facts as would exist under Rule [37(e)]." Allman, supra
note 26, at 45. Mr. Allman correctly suggests that, "the natural tendency of most
courts will be to use Rule [37(e)] as a 'guidepost' or reference point in exercising
their inherent powers." Id. In view of the serious sanctions that may be imposed for
breaching the duty to preserve, potential litigants need greater certainty.
The duty to preserve applies to plaintiffs. See, e.g., Silvestri v. Gen. Motors Corp.,
271 F.3d 583, 592 (4th Cir. 2001); see also, LEGAL HOLDS, supra note 17, at 1 ("This
duty [to preserve] arises ... whether the organization is the initiator or the target of
litigation.").
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Given the multiple uncertainties surrounding the duty to preserve, a
potential civil litigant must guess 93 at the scope of the pre-litigation
duty to preserve: "Not until after a court rules on the need to search
and produce from the source, can or will, a party know if its initial
preservation decisions were correct." 94 It has recently been noted
that "[a] producing party can face a Hobson's choice between the
burden and cost of preservation and the risk of sanctions for failing to
do so." 95 The party will not know if it made the correct choice until
months later, when a court decides the issue.
That situation, however, is not consistent with the philosophy
behind the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. 96 In 1938, amendments
to those Rules introduced the concepts of interrogatories and
document requests to federal civil litigation. 97 From this modest
start, the scope of discovery expanded to encompass the virtually
open-ended discovery of all facts related to the "subject matter" of
the litigation. In the 1990s, studies demonstrated that the costs
attendant with such a standard had become prohibitive, 98 and the
93.

94.
95.

"The ultimate protection for a party whose 'guess' turns out to be wrong is that the
decisions were reasonable, made in good faith, and not intended to obstruct or
prevent the discovery of relevant information." See Allman, supra note 36, at 26
n.80.
Id. 25.
THE SEDONA CONFERENCE DRAFT WORKING GROUP I COMMENTARY ON PRESERVING
AND MANAGING INFORMATION THAT IS NOT REASONABLY ACCESSIBLE 3 n.7 (drft. ed.

2008) (Draft cited with the permission of The Sedona Conference®. Working Group
Commentaries are not publicly available until adopted by consensus and published
on The Sedona Conference® web site, http://thesedonaconference.org; until then, the
text is subject to change. Publication of this commentary is anticipated in the
summer of 2008.) (unpublished commentary, on file with author) [hereinafter
PRESERVING AND MANAGING INFORMATION].

96.

97.

98.

FED. R. Civ. P. 1 provides: "[These rules] shall be construed and administered to
secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action and
proceeding."
For a discussion of the history of changes to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see
generally Joseph Gallagher, E-Ethics: The Ethical Dimension of the Electronic
Discovery Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,20 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 613, 613; Hodgman, supra note 17, at 263-65; Marcus, supra note 50, at
255-57, 280 (noting that discovery rules have been amended more than other rules);
Marcus, supra note 9, at 1-6; Redish, supra note 5, at 563.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1) advisory committee's note to the 2000 amendments; see,
e.g., ACF Indus., Inc. v. EEOC, 439 U.S. 1081, 1086 (1979) ("The extent of this
[discovery] abuse has been of increasing concern. It was the subject of close
attention at the Pound Conference held in St. Paul, Minn., in April 1976, and it was
scrutinized further by the Pound Conference Follow-Up Task Force. The Task
Force, chaired by then Judge Griffin B. Bell, recommended that the appropriate
organizations of the bench and bar should 'accord a high priority to the problem of
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2000 amendments to the Federal Rules scaled back the scope to
discovery pertaining to the claims and defenses in the action, 99- with
judges being directed to take an active role in supervising the
discovery process.' 00 One purpose of the 2000 amendments was to
emphasize the need for active judicial intervention to ensure the
proportionality of discovery through Rule 26(b)(2).1 0 '
Then, in December 2006, new Federal Rules regarding ESI went
into effect. 1° 2 There is no indication that the 2006 amendments were
designed to undercut the philosophy behind the 2000 amendments. If
the duty to preserve is coextensive with the party's discovery
obligations, then it is logical to assert that the prudential limitations
on discovery should be engrafted by analogy on the pre-litigation
03
duty to preserve.
that supports a proportionality' 4
There is ample authority'
analysis in the context of the duty to preserve, but none has been
found applying the cost-benefit limitations of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 26(b)(2)(C)

99.

100.
101.
102.
103.

104.

105.

10 5

or the "safe harbor" of Rule 37(e) 10 6 by

abuses in the use of pretrial procedures ... with a view to appropriate action by state
and federal courts."' (footnotes omitted)).
The Rules confer discretion to permit "subject matter" discovery. See FED. R. CIV. P.
26(b)(1) ("For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter relevant to
the subject matter involved in the action.").
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26 advisory committee's note (b)(1) to the 2000 amendments.
See id.
The Federal Advisory Committee began its work on electronically stored information
in 1996. Marcus, supra note 9, at 6; see Marcus, supra note 2, at 604.
See, e.g., Allman, supra note 36, at 26 ("However, just as the duty to produce is
tempered by the principle of proportionality, so should courts take the same approach
in regard to preservation decisions."); see Wiginton v. Ellis, No. 02 C 6832, 2003
WL 22439865 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 27, 2003); PAUL & NEARON, supra note 50, at 36
(describing the standard as one of "reasonableness"); LEGAL HOLDS, supra note 17, at
2 ("The keys to addressing these issues are reasonableness and good faith."); Goss,
supra note 27, at 822; see also THE SEDONA CONFERENCE, THE SEDONA PRINCIPLES:
BEST PRACTICE RECOMMENDATIONS FOR ADDRESSING ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT
available at http://www.thesedonaconference.org/
3 (2003),
PRODUCTION,
dltForm?did=SedonaPrinciples200303.pdf ("However, this principle-that storing
information in an electronic format does not exclude it from the realm of potential
discovery-does not provide specific guidance on where courts and litigants should
draw the lines in applying the proportionality test of Rule 26 to electronic discovery
requests and disputes.").
The principle of proportionality is that the burdens imposed by the duty to preserve
should be proportionate to what is at stake in the litigation. Proportionality is often
stated in terms of the duty to preserve being one requiring only "reasonable" efforts.
See Wiginton, 2003 WL 22439865, at *4. See generally Thompson v. U.S. Dep't of
Hous. & Urban Dev., 219 F.R.D. 93, 97-99 (D. Md. 2003).
FED. R. Crv. P. 26(b)(2)(C) provides:
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analogy. 0 7 The current thought process appears to be that potentially
discoverable information must be preserved, although there is an
implicit notion that the scope of preservation should somehow be
proportional to the amount in controversy and the costs and burdens
of preservation. This article suggests that the best mechanism for
balancing discoverability and proportionality is the application, by
analogy, of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C) and 37(e) to
the pre-litigation duty to preserve.
The need for guidance is clear. For example, compare the
principles regarding the duty to preserve backup tapes. It has
recently been noted that "the parameters of [the duty to preserve's]
18
application to backup tapes have not yet been fully defined."'
On motion or on its own, the court must limit the frequency or
extent of discovery otherwise allowed by these rules or by local
rule if it determines that: (i) the discovery sought is unreasonably
cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other
source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less
expensive; (ii) the party seeking discovery has had ample
opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action;
or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery outweighs
its likely benefit, considering the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at
stake in the action, and the importance of the discovery in
resolving the issues.
Many states have rules similar to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(2)(C). See
generally Thomas Y. Allman & Ashish S. Prasad, The Forgotten Cousin: State
Rulemaking and Electronic Discovery, in ELECTRONIC DISCOVERY AND RETENTION
GUIDANCE FOR CORPORATE COUNSEL 2007 317, 328, 335-38 app. (PLI Litig. &

106.

107.

Admin. Practice, Course Handbook Series No. 11596, 2007) WL 766 PLIILit 317
(discussing state rules governing ESI). In Maryland, for example, Rule 2-402(b) is
analogous. See MD. R. 2-402(b). Thus, even where the duty to preserve is governed
by state law, the principles set out in this article may be applicable.
Rule 37(f) was moved to Rule 37(e) in December 2007, without substantive change.
The Rule provides: "Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose
sanctions under these rules on a party for failing to provide electronically stored
information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of an electronic
information system." FED. R. CIv. P. 37(e).
In one decision, Rule [37(e)] was relied upon to excuse a failure to preserve. Allman,
supra note 26, at 46 & n. 110 (citing Convolve, Inc. v. Compaq Computer Corp.,
223 F.R.D. 162, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 2004)). In an as-yet unpublished, April 22,
2008, draft Commentary, the Sedona Conference suggests applying Rule
26(b)(2)(C) factors to the pre-litigation duty to preserve.
MANAGING INFORMATION, supra note 95, at 15-16.

108.

PRESERVING AND

Grant J. Esposito & Thomas M. Mueller, Backup Tapes, You Can't Live with Them
and You Can't Toss Them: Strategies for Dealing with the Litigation Burdens
Associatedwith Backup Tapes Under the Amended FederalRules of Civil Procedure,
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There is "generally" no duty to preserve such tapes; 10 9 however, if the
backup tapes pertinent to key players can be identified, there may be
a duty to preserve them." 0 This creates a dilemma for a preserving
party."'
Consider also the preserving party's choice-of-law dilemma. Faced
with reasonably anticipated litigation and a duty to preserve, the
preserving party's decisions may be governed by the source of the
duty. If the duty arises under statute, regulation, court order, or
contract, the source document may define the duty. If the duty arises
under common-law, the duty may be a state duty for state courts and
diversity cases, or a federal one for federal-question cases. Where2
federal and supplemental state claims are joined in a single action,''
there could be differing duties. And the consequence of a breach-

109.
110.

111.

13 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13,
10 (2007), http://law.richmond.edu/jolt/vl3i3/
article 13.pdf; see also Withers, supra note 14, at 189. "In short, requesting parties
consider backup tapes to be a wealth of information. Producing parties consider
them to be the equivalent of a vast waste dump. Thus, not surprisingly, the courts
have offered inconsistent guidance as to how they will be treated." Bennett, supra
note 3, at 133; see generally Kenneth J. Withers, Computer-Based Discovery in
Federal Civil Litigation, 1 FED. CTS. L. REV. 65, 74-75 (2006) (noting unique
problems presented by backup tapes).
Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 217 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
See id. at 217-18; see also Cache La Poudre Feeds, LLC. v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., No.
04-cv-00329-WYD-CBS, 2007 WL 684001, at *623 n.10 (D. Colo. Mar. 2, 2007);
Hodgman, supra note 17, at 271 ("Backup tapes probably fall under the litigation
hold if they are accessible, not obsolete due to technological advances, and currently
used to retrieve information."); Withers, Computer-BasedDiscovery, supra note 108,
at 71 ("In Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., the defendant faced sanctions in the form of
costs and a spoliation inference stemming from counsel's failure to completely
investigate stored computer backup tapes, while representing to the court that all
relevant computer files had been produced." (footnote omitted)).
See Follett, supra note 51, at 248-50 ("One can question whether the Zubulake IV
'exceptions' swallow the rule. For example, backup tapes are always 'accessible' to
some degree, and companies may use backup tapes (at least recent ones) for nonemergency document retrieval on occasion. Moreover, it is almost always possible
for a company to 'identify where particular employee documents are stored on
backup tapes,' provided it spends enough time and money to restore and search the
tapes ....

112.

Recycling of backup tapes poses a trickier issue, [and it] is highly fact-

specific .... ").
It is important to note that the issue of inaccessible media is currently being
addressed by the Sedona Conference. The Sedona Conference suggests that
"[r]egardless of the accessibility of the source of potentially discoverable
information, if the burdens and costs of preservation are disproportionate to the
potential value of the information sought, it is reasonable to decline to preserve the
source." PRESERVING AND MANAGING INFORMATION, supra note 95, at 15.
See 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006); Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 216 (discussing generally
the duty to preserve).
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whether spoliation is a tort or an evidentiary doctrine-may differ
depending on the forum. Absent clear guidance regarding limits on
the scope of the duty to preserve, a party engaged in a good-faith
effort to preserve evidence prior to litigation may prove the military
maxim that any ship can be a minesweeper-once.
Cases imposing substantial sanctions, including criminal
prosecution, adverse inference instructions, restrictions on testimony,
and monetary penalties, as well as the attendant ethical implications,
demonstrate that a misstep in determining the scope of the duty may
have serious consequences.1 14 The serious consequences may compel
a risk-adverse potential litigant to exercise extraordinary care in
preserving "everything" at enormous cost and effort, although such
extraordinary effort is not required by law. 1 5 Because the duty to
preserve often arises before a lawsuit is filed, the duty may arise
during a "free for all" period where there is no judicial umpire, 1 16 no
opposing counsel available or willing to negotiate the scope, no clear
limitation based on practical realities of the business world, and no
way to determine the applicable source of law, i.e., statutory,
regulatory, federal, or state, and, if state, which one. While Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 1 calls for the just, speedy, and inexpensive
resolution of disputes, this lack of guidance suggests that prudent
counsel and cautious litigants may expend enormous sums to
preserve ESI that need not be preserved, will never be produced in
discovery, 1 7 and that may exceed the economic value of the claims
presented, in contravention of the fundamental principle underlying
the Federal Rules.
Consider a hypothetical example. X purchases a used motor
vehicle from Auto Dealer, Inc., for $5,000. A dispute over the
vehicle arises and X contends that two salespersons made
misrepresentations, that Auto Dealer's web site contained false
statements, and that X saw the salespersons exchanging email or text
messages during the purchase and sale negotiations. X, acting pro se,
113.

Posting of Brian to http://www.bimmerfest.com/forums/archive/index.php/t535 10.html (Feb. 24, 2004, 06:35 EST) (quoting Anonymous).

114.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.4(a) (2008); PAUL & NEARON, supra

115.

116.

117.

note 50, at 46 (describing a range of available sanctions).
See, e.g., Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. at 217 ("Must a corporation, upon recognizing the
threat of litigation, preserve every shred of paper, every e-mail or electronic
document, and every backup tape? The answer is clearly, 'no'.").
See Bennett, supra note 3, at 127 (noting that the preservation obligation occurs
before there is a chance for a "meet and confer" and before there is "a chance to
approach the court for a ruling on the reasonableness of the preservation approach").
See supra note 9.
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sends a letter to Auto Dealer suggesting that a lawsuit will follow if
$5,000 is not paid immediately. X, a computer programmer, asks
that Auto Dealer mirror image the salespersons' computers, PDAs,
voicemails, cell phones, and network folders. X believes that the
salespersons communicated electronically with a supervisor, and
demands preservation and imaging of the unknown supervisor's ESI.
X demands preservation of all of the vehicle's maintenance records
and all ESI that refers or relates to Auto Dealer's acquisition of the
auto. X demands that the current and past web pages be preserved.
X also seeks preservation of ESI related to the salespersons'
communications with other purchasers, asserting that the
misrepresentations were part of a pattern. Finally, X also asks for
preservation of all of the vehicle's manufacturer's recall ESI received
by Auto Dealer. In the current marketplace, the cost to Auto Dealer
of preserving the ESI would be greater than the cost of the claim.
There is no judge to referee the dispute because suit has not been
filed. There is no opposing attorney to negotiate with, because X is
pro se. Because X likely has no ESI to preserve, there is no
reciprocal interest-known during the Cold War as "mutually assured
destruction" or the "balance of terror"-on X's part in reducing
reliance on Auto Dealer's ESI. Absent a principled limit on the
scope of the duty to preserve, Auto Dealer must either expend more
than the claim is worth to preserve ESI, or fail to preserve
discoverable ESI and risk an adverse inference instruction, order
precluding testimony, default judgment, or monetary sanction. Auto
Dealer's decision could be made even more complex if X were able
to assert both federal and state claims, as well as regulatory claims.
How would the application of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and 37(e) factors
assist Auto Dealer? First, Auto Dealer would have a readily available
source of guidance, the body of case law interpreting Rule
26(b)(2)(C) and its predecessor. Auto Dealer might assert that it
would be reasonable to spend a specified number of hours and funds
performing preservation tasks, and that any additional efforts would
l
be undertaken only upon payment by the requesting person.' 1
118.

See Marens v. Carrabba's Italian Grill, Inc., 196 F.R.D. 35, 37-38 (D. Md. 2000)
("[Former] Rule 26(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 26 requires the
court to balance various factors to determine just how much discovery is reasonable
in a given case. This analysis is tailored to the particular needs of each case, and
requires the court to consider both the importance of the discovery sought to the
moving party, as well as the cost and burden to the producing party. The court is
given great flexibility to order only that discovery that is reasonable for a case, and to
adjust the timing of discovery and apportion costs and burdens in a way that is fair
and reasonable .... Rule 26(b)(2) allows the Court to direct alternative methods of
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Second, if ESI had been lost prior to notice of the claim, due to
routine operation of the information system, Auto Dealer could seek
protection under the Rule 37(e) "safe harbor."'1 19 Third, Auto Dealer
could note that the extent of use of the discovery methods, including
coextensive preservation efforts, shall be limited by the court under
specific circumstances. 120 Auto Dealer might interview its
employees, review its paper documents and active data, and
determine that expensive preservation of deleted and fragmented data
was unnecessary because "the discovery sought is unreasonably
cumulative or duplicative, or can be obtained from some other source
that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive " thereby
obviating a need for some costly electronic preservation. 21 More
significantly, Auto Dealer would be able to assert that "the burden or
expense of the proposed discovery outweighs its likely benefit,
considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, the
parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the action,
and the importance of the discovery in resolving the issues."' 122 If
Auto Dealer could determine that there was no need for metadata or
deleted data because of the nature of the allegations or the
information technology, it might be able to decide not to preserve
some ESI because other data would provide X with "ample
123
opportunity to obtain the information by discovery in the action."
These Rule 26(b)(2)(C) and 37(e) factors provide Auto Dealer with
substantially more guidance than the bare concept of
"proportionality" or "reasonableness." If Auto Dealer is subsequently
faced with a spoliation motion for sanctions, it-and its counsel-

discovery, if they are more reasonable than that chosen by a party, and objected to by
another. . . . Defendant will produce responsive documents prepared by general
managers within its Virginia, Washington D.C. and Maryland restaurants for the five
years preceding the termination of the plaintiffs employment. The search time for
this information will be included in the 40 hours referred to with respect to request
no. 1, above. If, after review of the additional documents, plaintiff desires further
discovery, he may file a motion requesting it, and if meritorious, further discovery
will be allowed, subject to review by the Court to determine whether plaintiff should

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

pay all or part of the cost of further discovery." (citations omitted)). The textual
argument is not inconsistent with the presumption that the producing party bear the
cost of producing active ESI, because it would be made in the pre-litigation context
of a common-law duty to preserve, not to produce.
See FED. R. CIv. P. 37(e).
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C).
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(i).
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(ii).
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will have, at a minimum, detailed standards on which to base their
arguments.
To give one other example, assume that a potential litigant has four
servers and twenty work stations, older legacy computers, plus
backup tapes. Next, assume that litigation is reasonably anticipated,
and that it will center on a commercial dispute over contract
interpretation, with no allegations of fraud or dishonesty. Assume
that the issue is whether A delivered conforming goods to B.
Obviously, pertinent commercial documents, such as the orders,
invoices, and contract should be preserved. The general duty to
preserve may also include deleted data, data in slack spaces, backup
tapes, legacy systems, and metadata, related to orders, invoices,
shipping manifests, the contract, email, and correspondence, although
there may be no need for this information, and it may be that the
dispute can be resolved using basic email and word processing
documents without resorting to more expensive-to-preserve-andproduce ESI sources.1 24 Assume further that the opposing entity
either refuses to negotiate a reasonable preservation regime or is not
represented by counsel. Rather than pay tens of thousands of dollars
to preserve deleted data and metadata, the preserving party could
decide not to incur the high cost of preserving the data and, if later
challenged, assert under Rule 26(b)(2)(C)(iii) that "the burden or
expense of the proposed [preservation] outweighs its likely benefit,
considering the needs of the case.., and the importance of the
discovery in resolving the issues." 125 While the preserving party is
still at risk if it chooses not to preserve the deleted data, absent
application of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) by analogy, the preserving party
or
could
assert only a defense of "reasonableness"
"proportionality." 126 Application of Rule 26(b)(2)(C) by analogy,
while it provides imperfect protection, increases the level of
speedy, and
protection and thereby effectuates the goal of "just,
27
inexpensive resolution[]" of the forthcoming action.'

124.

125.
126.
127.

See Mich. First Credit Union v. Cumis Ins. Soc'y, Inc., No. 05-74423, 2007 WL
4098213, at *2 (E.D. Mich. Nov. 16, 2007) (stating that "most" metadata is "of
limited evidentiary value" (citing Wyeth v. Impax Labs., Inc., No. Civ.A. 06-222JJF, 2006 WL 3091331, at *2 (D. Del. Oct. 26, 2006))); see also Williams v.
Sprint/United Mgmt. Co., 230 F.R.D. 640, 651 (D. Kan. 2005) (stating "most of the
metadata has no evidentiary value"). It is likely that the same could be said of much
deleted data. The need for such data is generally fact-sensitive or case-specific.
FED. R. Cry. P. 26(b)(2)(C)(iii).
See supra note 104 and explanation therein.
28 U.S.C. § 471 (2006); FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
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It is recognized that the cost-benefit limits on discovery may be
amorphous and difficult to apply to pre-litigation preservation
decisions. Application of those concepts, however, will provide the
most detailed standard to guide discretion, and may provide
preserving parties with a good faith defense to spoliation claims, or
alternatively, may strip them of an unreasonable defense.
Application of the Rule's principles will permit parties to articulate
reasoned bases for decisions to limit the scope of their preservation
obligations or, alternatively, to challenge unreasonably limited efforts
to preserve ESI. Faced with a spoliation motion, 128 for example,
counsel may persuasively argue that the common-law duty to
preserve ESI should not be interpreted to mandate that Auto Dealer
29
spend $25,000 preserving ESI to defend against a $5,000 claim.
Similarly, faced with a $15 million claim, a preserving party may
find it difficult to assert that it was not required to expend $100,000
to preserve ESI. If it is correct to state that "[t]he scope of the duty to
preserve evidence is not boundless,"' 13
Rule 26(b)(2)(C) should
assist in defining the boundary.
VI. CONCLUSION
The uncertain scope of preservation obligations before litigation is
filed, coupled with the risk of serious sanctions when relevant ESI is
not preserved, encourages over-broad pre-litigation preservation
efforts, resulting in the expenditure of vast sums to preserve ESI that
need not be preserved. Given that a party is provided far more detail
concerning the range of potentially discoverable information after
litigation is commenced, a party's pre-litigation failure to preserve
should not result in more onerous sanctions than a party's failure to
preserve post-filing. Although not explicitly relevant pre-litigation,
application by analogy of Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
128.

129.

130.

The first element of a spoliation claim is that the allegedly spoliating party breached
its duty to preserve information. Boyd v. Travelers Ins. Co., 652 N.E.2d 267, 270
(I11.
1995). If, under Rule 26(b)(2)(C)'s application by analogy, there was no duty to
preserve, there has not been spoliation. See Baugher v. Gates Rubber Co., 863
S.W.2d 905, 911-12 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) (finding that, if common law elements of
tort are not met, dismissal is appropriate).
"At some point the adversary system needs to say 'enough is enough' and recognize
that the costs of seeking every relevant piece of discovery is not reasonable."
Esposito & Mueller, supra note 108, at 28 n.88 (citing Cognex Corp. v. Electro
Scientific Indus. Inc., No. Civ.A. O1CV10287RCL, 2002 WL 32309413, at *5 (D.
Mass. July 2, 2002)) (emphasis in original).
RICE, supra note 27, at 72. The writer made this comment in the context of assessing
the duration of the duty to preserve.
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26(b)(2)(C) and 37(e), to the pre-litigation duty to preserve provides
the best mechanism for defining the limits of the duty to preserve and
providing litigants with practical guidelines in a perilous area where a
misstep could have significant ramifications.

